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EDUCATING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AT
SUMMERS' SCHOOL: A LESSON ON THE "SPECIAL CHARACTER
OF THE ANIMAL"
BY
RAFAEL GELY,* RAMONA L. PAETZOLD,

AND LEONARD BIERMANm

"Public employee bargaining suffers from cognitive dissonance because,
though seemingly similar to private sector bargaining, it differs
fundamentally in that it is part of the political process for conducting the
government's business."I
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I. INTRODUCTION

Defining the content and extent of public employees' workplace rights
has proven to be a remarkably difficult and frustrating process.2 The
process has been difficult because the idiosyncrasies of the public
employment sector raise some complex issues that do not arise in the
private sector context. Public employees are not only employees but also
citizens interacting with government officials. As such, they stand on a
different footing than private sector employees.3 Public employees enjoy
certain constitutionally provided protections not generally available in the
private sector.4 And, even when acting as an employer, the government is
constrained by constitutional principles that do not affect most private
sector employers.
At times, this distinction has resulted in public sector employees
enjoying some employment and labor protections not available to their
private sector counterparts, such as the protections granted since the early
1900s under various federal and local versions of the civil service system. 6
At other times, however, public sector employees have seen their
employment and labor rights fall behind those of private employees, as has
been the case with regard to their ability to organize and bargain
collectively.
Professor Clyde W. Summers understood the differences between the
public and private sectors better than anyone. In a series of four articles
2. See John Lund & Cheryl L. Maranto, Public Sector Labor Law: An Update, in PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 21, 21 (Dale Belman, Morley Gunderson & Douglas
Hyatt eds., 1996) (referring to public sector employment laws as a "crazy-quilt patchwork of state and
local laws, regulations executive orders, court decisions, and attorney general opinions"); see also
James T. Bennett & Marick F. Masters, The Future of Public Sector Labor-ManagementRelations, 24
J. LAB. RES. 533, 535 (2003).
3. See Richard B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. EcoN. LIT. 41, 42 1986)
(noting that unlike employees in the private sector, as voters, employees in the public sector play a role
in selecting their employers).
4. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (dealing with privacy issues); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (dealing with issues of free speech); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)
(dealing with political activities); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (dealing with
freedom of association).
5. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,
500 (1967) (noting that "policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down
version of constitutional rights").
6. See Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Restricting Public Employees' Political Activities:
Good Government or PartisanPolitics?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 775, 797-98 (2000) (describing the origins
of the civil service system).
7. See Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know 'What A Labor Union Is': How State
Structures and Judicial (Mis) ConstructionsDeformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981,
981-82 (2000) (noting that while private sector employees received statutory protection with regard to
organizing and bargaining rights as early as 1935, no similar protection existed for public employees
until the mid 1960s).
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published in the span of thirty-five years, Professor Summers developed a
sophisticated framework for understanding the dynamics and structures of
the public sector labor relations process. This framework, in which he
fondly refers to public sector bargaining as a "different animal," 9 first and
foremost recognizes that public sector collective bargaining is different
from private sector collective bargaining because public employment is
different from private employment.1o In particular, notes Professor
Summers, "in private employment collective bargaining is a process of
private decisionmaking shaped primarily by market forces, while in public
employment it is a process of governmental decisionmaking shaped
ultimately by political forces."" That is, the key difference between public
and private employment is that in the former the "employer is government;
the ones who act on behalf of the employer are public officials; and the
ones to whom those officials are answerable are citizens and voters."' 2
Based on this basic premise, Professor Summers goes on to develop a
series of normative implications having application primarily with regard to
the operation of the collective bargaining process in the public sector. For
example, Professor Summers makes fairly specific proposals as to the type
of subjects that should be channeled through the collective bargaining
process and those that should be left to other political channels.' 3 He also
makes normative arguments in favor of granting (at least some) public
employees the right to strike and against the use of interest arbitration as a
means of resolving bargaining disputes in the public sector.14
Professor Summers' main lesson is that in designing and adopting
policies regarding the regulation of the public employment relationship,
decisionmakers must be aware of the different character of the public
employment animal. Neither wholesale adoption nor rejection of the
private employment model will do. A careful examination of the
differences between the two sectors and the manner in which those
differences affect the role played by all the relevant actors is crucial in

&

8. The series of articles include Principlesand Politics,supra note 1; Clyde W. Summers, Public
Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974) [hereinafter A Political
Perspective]; Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining, A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB.
ElvtP. L. 441 (2002-2003) [hereinafter A Different Animal]; and Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector
Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669 (1975) [hereinafter
Governmental Decisionmaking].
9. A Different Animal, supra note 8, at 441.
10. A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8, at 1156.
11. Id.
12. Governmental Decisionmaking, supra note 8, at 670.
13. A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8, at 1177-83.
14. Principlesand Politics, supra note 1, at 274-8 1.
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adopting policies that make sense.
Professor Summers' work in this area has become particularly relevant
in light of two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which
we aver are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the public
employment relationship. Specifically, this article advances the argument
that the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Garcettiv. Ceballos" and
Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'nl6 represent a shift towards what
we refer to as the privatization of public sector employment law. We argue
that in these two cases, the Supreme Court fails to recognize the different
contexts in which private and public employees operate, choosing instead
to apply principles that, while perhaps well-suited to the private sector, are
arguably incompatible with the dynamics of the employment relationship in
the public sector. We note that such a privatization shift significantly
reduces the labor and employment law protections available to public
employees.
In this article, we explore the implications that Professor Summers'
insights regarding public employment have for the Garcetti and Davenport
decisions. In particular, we focus on the extent to which the political nature
of public employment affects public employees' rights to freedom of
speech as well as matters regarding the representational functions of public
employee unions.
With regard to the former, we begin with Professor Summers'
observation about the nature of managerial decisionmaking in the public
sector. He points out that public employment involves not only managerial
decisionmaking, that is, decisions "shaped primarily by market forces,"l 7
but that it also involves decisionmaking "shaped primarily by political
forces."' 8 This insight places in a new light the nature of the speech in
which public employees engage and the functions they perform in their
dual roles as employees and citizens. In this article, we explore the
implications that Professor Summers' framework for understanding public
employment have for the way we define workplace speech rights.
Professor Summers' framework also is relevant to our understanding
of the role that public sector unions play in representing employees. In a
particularly insightful observation, Professor Summers explains the reasons
why union representation (and thus collective bargaining) is needed in the
public sector. According to Summers, public employee bargaining is
15.
16.
17.
18.

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
551 U.S. 177 (2007).
A PoliticalPerspective, supranote 8, at 1156.
Id.
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needed because "our political system has a built-in bias which requires
it."' 9 He notes that in the public sector context, employees are basically
outnumbered by other groups having interests in getting more and better
public services at the lowest possible cost.20 The political process,
therefore, does not adequately protect public employees in their interests as
employees. 2 1 Collective bargaining becomes an equalizer - a process that
gives public employees "an ability to counteract the overriding political
strength of other voters who constantly press for lower taxes and increased
services." 22
A corollary of this clever observation is equally important. Collective
bargaining in the public sector is but one of the tools available to public
employees to deal with their employers. Just like other citizens, they have
the ability to engage in various forms of action (e.g., speeches, petitions,
voting) to influence the policies adopted by their elected officials. Granting
public employees the right to organize and bargain collectively should not
result in a reduction in other forms of political participation, because a
combination of approaches is likely required to affect government
decisions. Professor Summers is aware of this when he cautions us about
transplanting the practices of private sector bargaining into the public
sector. Instead, notes Professor Summers, the focus should be on
understanding, "what practices in the public sector will improve the
political process." 23
This insight is particularly relevant to what we believe are the serious
and undesirable implications of the Davenport decision. In Davenport, the
Supreme Court held that a state statute requiring that public sector unions
provide an "opt-in" provision, which prevented public sector unions from
collecting agency fees for collective bargaining functions from non-union
employees unless they explicitly opted in, was constitutionally
permissible.24 Although involving a very different issue, the Supreme
Court decision in Davenport raises concerns that are similar to those raised
by Garcetti, namely, the Court's failure to recognize the differences
between public and private employment. Even more troubling in
Davenport is the attempt by the Court to apply principles developed in the
context of private sector labor law to the public sector, thus going one step
further in privatizing public sector employment and labor law.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

PrinciplesandPolitics, supra note 1, at 268.
Id.
A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8, at 1160.
Governmental Decisionmaking, supranote 8, at 675.
A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8, at 1161.
Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184.
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The article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we discuss in detail the
work of Professor Summers on public sector employment and labor law.2 5
While his work has implications for a variety of issues, we focus our
attention on those implications of relevance to questions of public
employee speech and the role of public sector labor organizations. In Part
III, we briefly summarize the Garcetti and Davenport decisions, while in
Part IV, we develop the argument that these two decisions are indicative of
a new, and in our opinion misguided, approach to deal with issues
concerning public sector employment and labor law.26 We challenge the
Court's recent decisions by analyzing them through the lens of Professor
Summers' work in this area. Part V concludes the paper.
II. GOING TO SUMMERS' SCHOOL: LESSONS ON THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

A. A PoliticalPerspective in New Haven
Professor Summers' most influential paper on public sector collective
bargaining and the role of public employees was published in the Yale Law
Journal in 1974 near the end of his career on the faculty of the Yale Law
School. The paper, Public Employee Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective,27
makes the key point that "government is not just another industry" and that
the introduction of collective bargaining into the public sector has had a
major impact on restructuring various "political processes." 28 Professor
Summers begins this paper by describing the manner in which decisions
regarding terms and conditions of employment are made in the public
sector. First, Professor Summers points out that in the public sector,
decisions about the employment relationship are "governmental decisions
made through the political process." 2 9 While economic considerations
factor into those decisions, they nonetheless remain ultimately political
decisions. 3 0 Second, in the public sector, the employer is not necessarily an
elected official who at any given point in time holds elected office, but is
instead "the voters to which the public officials are responsible." 3 1

25. See infra notes 27-77 and accompanying text.
26. Part III is discussed infra notes 78-121 and accompanying text, while Part IV is discussed
infra notes 122-150 and accompanying text.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id.
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Professor Summers notes that voters, as purchasers and users of public
services, have economic interests that are inherently in conflict with those
of public employees, because voters want "to maximize services and
minimize costs." 32 Third, public employees are and will always be
outnumbered by voters, and thus are at "a significant disadvantage when
their terms and conditions of employment are decided through a process
responsive to majority will." 33 Finally, notes Professor Summers, collective
bargaining is but one of several avenues through which public employees
could participate in determining the terms of their employment
relationship.34 Unlike employees in the private sector, public employees
can use the normal political process (e.g., vote, support candidates,
organize pressure groups) to influence decisions that affect their conditions
of employment.3 5
Professor Summers then explores how the introduction of collective
bargaining to the public employment context affects the manner in which
employment decisions are made. Professor Summers notes that where
public employees are allowed to organize and bargain collectively, "special
procedures" are created for making decisions about specific aspects of the
employment relationship.3 6 These special procedures, argues Professor
Summers, might be justified given the inherent numerical disadvantage at
which public employees find themselves. By recognizing that collective
bargaining in the public sector is a special procedure within the larger
context of the governmental decisionmaking process, Professor Summers is
able to frame the question not in terms of how public sector bargaining is
similar to private sector bargaining, but instead in terms of how the
introduction of collective bargaining into the public sector affects the
process by which decisions about the public employment relationship are
made.
In the remainder of this seminal article, Professor Summers answers
this question. He first discusses the effect of public sector collective
bargaining on the bottom line - that is, how collective bargaining alters the
budget-making process. It is here that the need for public sector collective
bargaining is more apparent. Professor Summers describes the budgeting
process in the public sector as "a complicated political bargaining process
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 1160.
Id.
Id.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1162 (noting that it is in the budget-making process "where public employee bargaining

has its primary impact").

100

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. I4:93

in which various interest groups seek to have larger shares of the budget
allocated for particular purposes."3 In this complicated process, public
employees represent but one of the many groups with their interests at
stake. Viewed within this context, collective bargaining provides public
employees with an official and especially effective and exclusive means for
influencing public officials.39 Professor Summers argues that such special
treatment is necessary to equalize the inherent disadvantage that public
employees otherwise face in the budgetary process. 40 In particular,
Professor Summers argues that not only are public employees outnumbered
in the political process, but in general, their interests are contrary to the
interest of every other interest group. Thus, concludes Professor Summers,
other interest groups will be able to form natural alliances against the
interest of public employees, making it impossible for public employees to
41
protect their employment interests through the political process.
Professor Summers concludes his article with what he refers to as a
"suggestive" preliminary exploration of the implications of his "political
perspective." 4 2 Two of the implications he discusses are particularly
relevant to this article: the implications of "end-run" bargaining,4 3 and the
definition of appropriate subjects of bargaining.44
Professor Summers explores the consequences of a failure to integrate
the budgetary and collective bargaining processes. Where the person or
agency negotiating the contract on the employer side is not in charge of
budgetary decisions, the possibility exists for "end-run" bargaining. 45 Endrun bargaining is normally associated with a situation where a union,
having failed to win a concession from the opposing side at the bargaining
table (e.g., the mayor), may seek to circumvent the bargaining table and
pressure the city council (or appropriate legislative authority) to incorporate
the benefit the union was seeking in the new budget.4 6 Professor Summers
notes, however, that there is another kind and perhaps more permicious
form of end-run that occurs when "the chief executive will agree to a costly

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1164-65.
40. Id. at 165.
41. Id. at 1166-68. Professor Summers, though, notes that this argument is weakened in situations
in which the interests of public employees coincide with those of other interest groups. In such cases,
public sector unions have the ability to form alliances through the normal political process, and thus,
arguably the need for collective bargaining is less pressing. Id. at 1173.
42. Id. at 1183.
43. Id. at 1184-86.
44. Id. at 1192-97.
45. Id. at 1186.
46. Id.
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contract and attempt to shift to the legislature the onus of either rejecting
the union's demands or approving increased taxes." 4 7 Professor Summers'
major concern here is that end-runs undermine the effectiveness of
collective bargaining.4 8 The broader implication is, however, that to the
extent that end-run bargaining is inevitable, a point that Professor Summers
readily concedes,4 9 collective bargaining is but one of the tools public
employees are likely to have to use in order to protect their interest as
employees. Negotiating a deal at the bargaining table does not guarantee
public employees that such a deal will be implemented. To fully protect the
gains made at the bargaining table, public employees and their unions need
to engage in other forms of political activities. Such engagement is not only
likely, but perhaps expected, as the parties understand that the collective
bargaining process is but one of the avenues available to implement policy
changes.
Professor Summers then discusses the implications of his model for
the related issue of the type of subjects that should be channeled through
the collective bargaining process. Professor Summers argues that to the
extent that public sector collective bargaining is justified on the grounds
that public employees tend to be outnumbered in the political sphere, and
thus need some way of leveling the playing field, the scope of collective
bargaining should be limited to those areas in which public employees are
likely to face "massed resistance." 5 0 Thus, argues Professor Summers,
collective bargaining should be limited to issues such as wages and
workloads, since in those issues the interests of public employees are likely
to run counter to the combined interests of taxpayers and every citizen who
uses the public service. 5 ' Collective bargaining, however, is inappropriate
in other areas and subjects where the interests of public employees are not
necessarily in conflict with the interests of all other stakeholders.5 2 That is,
disputes regarding issues in which the "political alignment of taxpayers and
users against employees does not occur"53 should be resolved through other
political channels, not through the collective bargaining process.
The import of this last observation is that public employees, even in
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1184 (noting that integration of bargaining authority and budgeting decisionmaking is
hard to achieve given that budgeting authority tends to be diffused across departments and agencies).
50. Id. at 1193.
51. Id. at 1194 (noting that in addition to wages and workloads, collective bargaining is
appropriate in issues such as insurance, pensions, sick leave, length of work week, overtime pay,
vacations, and holidays.)
52. Id.
53. Id.
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cases (and perhaps particularly so) where they enjoy collective bargaining
rights, must have the ability to engage in the political process by other
means. Many jurisdictions even impose limits on the types of subjects
public sector unions are allowed to bring to the bargaining table.5 4 In those
instances, in particular, public employees must have the ability to
participate in the political process through other means. Policies that limit
the ability of public employees to participate in the political process also
limit the ability of public employees to protect their employment interests.
B. Decisionmaking in Cincinnati
While his 1974 Yale Law Journal article is his most influential and
widely cited paper on the topic (in part likely because of the nature of the
outlet), a keynote address he gave to a public sector labor symposium at the
University of Cincinnati Law School the following year and published in
that school's law review is arguably the best paper he has authored on the
subject.5 ' The 1975 article is unusually well written, even for someone with
well-recognized extraordinary legal writing talents.
As in his Yale Law Journal article, Professor Summers begins with a
discussion about the uniqueness of public sector bargaining. 56 However
here, Professor Summers focuses more on the actors than on the process
itself. He first states quite directly that "[t]here is nothing unique about
public employees." 57 He points out that they have the same "needs,"
"values," and "capacities" as private sector employees, and that many
public employees have previously worked in the private sector or may do
so in the future.ss Moreover, he quite articulately points out that there
really is nothing all that "unique about the work which public employees
perform." 59 He notes, rather insightfully, that the private sector also
employs nurses, janitors, construction workers, and even teachers, and that
the work performed in the private sector in this regard may actually be just
as "critical" (e.g., in the event of a work stoppage) as that done in the
public sector.6 0 Is, for example, the impact of a strike by teachers at a
parochial high school really all that different from the impact of a strike by

54. See PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 213-20 (Joseph R. Grodin et al.

eds., 2004) for a sampling of states' approaches to defining mandatory subjects of bargaining.
55. Governmental Decisionmaking,supra note 8.
56. Id. at 669-72.
57. Id. at 669.
58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 669-70.
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teachers at a public high school?61
So Professor Summers asks, what is unique about public employment
(and derivatively public sector collective bargaining)? In his University of
Cincinnati Law Review piece, Professor Summers states that the
"uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor in the work
performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the employer." 6 2 In
such situations the "employer is government" and it is public officials
answerable to "citizens and voters" that are acting "on behalf of the
employer." 6 3 In short, in Professor Summers' opinion it is the nature of the
employer, not the employees, that makes public sector labor law so
different.
This lens for viewing public sector bargaining clarifies a number of
significant issues. First, and as noted in his Yale Law Journalarticle, public
sector employees are also "citizens" and they already have "a voice in
[political] decisionmaking through customary political channels." 64 Thus,
one key difference between public sector employees and private sector
employees is that public sector workers are both simultaneously employees
and "bosses," i.e., they are not only employees but also citizens with the
power to cast votes that help determine the makeup of local and state
governments and therefore the officials who will be their supervisors.
Private sector employees never really have the power to fire their bosses,
but public employees, at least hypothetically, do.
It is this phenomenon of public employee "duality" that is really at the
heart of Professor Summers' public sector labor law scholarship. In their
roles as "citizens," public employees inherently have First Amendment free
speech rights, as well as other rights afforded the citizenry at large.
Professor Summers is particularly concerned with identifying the subtle
ways in which the structures and processes of government decisionmaking
might infringe upon the speech rights of public employees. For example,
Professor Summers points out that the collective bargaining process itself
could interfere with the ability of employees to make their opinions known
to public officials. He illustrates this concern with a case involving a school
teacher who, at a public meeting of the school board, presented a petition
against a provision the union was trying to negotiate with the school
board.66 The school board was charged with a violation of the existing state
61. Id.
62. Id. at 670.

63. Id.
64. A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8, at 1193.
65. Governmental Decisionmaking,supra note 8, at 671.
66. Id. (discussing Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Emp. Rel. Bd., 231 N.W.2d 206 (Wis. 1975)).
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bargaining law for allowing the teacher to speak and then accepting the
teacher's position. Such action, according to the state agency, amounted to
a violation of the principle of exclusive representation: Allowing the
employer to directly deal with employees represented by a union weakened
the union's role as the employees' bargaining representative and thus
weakened the process of collective representation. While perfectly
acceptable in the private sector, argues Professor Summers, this decision
raises significant concerns in the context of public employees because it
appears to limit the ability of citizens, albeit public employees, "to make
their views known to public officials on public issues." 67
C. The Special Characterof the Animal: Toledo and Penn

-

As discussed above, the Cincinnati article proposes that the
uniqueness of public employment lies not with the employees, nor with the
work performed, but instead "in the special character of the employer." 6 8 In
the last two articles published by Professor Summers on this subject, he
uses even more vivid language when describing the unique nature of public
employment, referring in both articles to the "special character," 6 9 and a
"different" kind of animal. 7 0 This shift in language nicely captures the
essence of both articles in which Professor Summers replays his basic
framework while sharpening some of the specific arguments.
For example, in the article published in the Toledo Law Review,
Professor Summers frames the problem as one of cognitive dissonance
while participants acknowledge that differences exist between public and
private employment, the public sector bargaining statutes and regulations
are modeled after those in existence in the private sector. 7 Professor
Summers pays particular attention in this article to the processes available
in the public sector to deal with collective bargaining disputes - strikes and
interest arbitration. Professor Summers argues in favor of a limited right to
strike and against the use of interest arbitration.72 His rationale relates back
to his initial insight. Public employees must have the ability to participate
meaningfully in the political debate through a variety of means, including

67. GovernmentalDecisionmaking, supra note 8, at 671.
68. Id. at 670.
69. PrinciplesandPolitics, supra note 1, at 272.
70. A Different Animal, supra note 8.
71. PrinciplesandPolitics, supra note 1, at 265.
72. Professor Summers recognizes, though, that strikes might be "intolerable" for certain public
employees (police and firefighters) and thus that interest arbitration might be necessary with respect to
those employees. Id. at 280.
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strike activity.73 Professor Summers notes that when viewed through this
lens, strikes, just like the collective bargaining process itself, are but
another way of leveling the inherent disadvantage that public employees
face in the political arena.7 4
Professor Summers' concerns with the use of interest arbitration
derive from the same principle. According to Professor Summers, interest
arbitration is "wrong in principle" because it fails to recognize that
decisions about the terms of employment for public employees are political
decisions that should be left to a political process. 75 Interest arbitration
delegates the authority to make decisions to a party with no political
responsibility and allows public officials to avoid making decisions and
instead "push the decision off to an arbitrator." 7 6 In short, Professor
Summers' primary concern with the use of interest arbitration is its failure
to recognize the political nature of public employment, and the way it
interferes with the political process itself.
Professor Summers concludes the last of the four articles on this
subject with an observation that presciently foreshadows what we argue is
the wrongheaded path the Supreme Court has taken in recent years. In
referring to what he sees as the fundamental difference between private and
public employment - that in the public sector, the terms of employment are
made by government officials and are shaped by political and market forces
- Professor Summers notes:
The law and practice of public sector collective bargaining have been
slow to recognize and react to this fundamental difference and its impact.
In part, this is because most of the lawyers who represent the parties in
public sector bargaining are the same lawyers who represent the parties
in private sector bargaining. They have a tendency to carry over their
ways of thinking from the private to the public sector. The legislatures
also bear a large measure of responsibility, for they carried over the
language of the public sector statutes from the private sector. The
similarity of wording has induced a similarity of thinking.
In the remainder of this article, we argue that not only have lawyers
and legislatures missed the critical distinction that Professor Summers
forcefully asserts differentiates public and private employment, but that the
Supreme Court has recently made the same mistakes.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id.
A Different Animal, supra note 8, at 452.
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III. SKIPPING SUMMERS' SCHOOL: ENTER GARCETTI AND DAVENPORT
In this section, we briefly discuss the two recent Supreme Court
decisions in Garcetti v. Ceballos 7 8 and in Davenport v. Washington
EducationalAss'n.79 We argue that these two decisions are suggestive of a
trend towards the privatization of public sector employment and labor law.
Despite the fact that both decisions are fairly recent, they have already
generated a copious literature. Our intention here is not to examine either
case in close detail. We leave that task to others. Our goal is to identify the
elements of the Court's opinions that we argue are illustrative of the shift
towards a jurisprudence of privatization and in that way, hope to highlight
some of the implications that these two cases might have in the future
development of public sector labor and employment law.
A. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Garcetti involved a Section 1983 civil rights action by a deputy
district attorney, Richard Ceballos, against his supervisors, alleging that he
was subject to adverse employment action because of his speech.8 1
Specifically, Ceballos claimed to have suffered a series of retaliatory
employment actions following his decision to investigate and report, as part
of his job duties, concerns with a warrant that had been issued in a case that
was being prosecuted by the district attorney's office in which he worked.82
After a grievance filed by Ceballos was denied, he brought a Section 1983

&

78. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
79. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
80. On Garcetti, see, for example, Judith Areen, Government As Educator:A New Understanding
ofFirstAmendment Protection ofAcademic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEo. L.J. 945 (2009); Ruben
J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of Statutory Protectionfor Public
Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 22 (2008); Orly Lobel, Citizenship, OrganizationalCitizenship,
and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433 (2009); Helen Norton, Constraining
Public Employee Speech: Government's Controloflts Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression,
59 DuKE L. J. 1 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First
Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117 (2008); Gary W.
Spring, A New Methodology for Testing PermissiblePolitical Communications in the Workplace, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REv. 1023 (2008).
On Davenport, see, for example, Robert C. Cloud, Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n:
Agency Shop & First Amendment Revisited, 224 Educ. Law Rep. (West) 617 (2007); Harry G.
Hutchinson, Reclaiming the First Amendment through Union Dues Restrictions?, 10 U. PA. J. Bus.
EMP. L. 663 (2008); Erik S. Jaffe, When Easy Cases Make Bad Law: Davenport v. Washington
Education Association and Washington v. Washington Education Association, 2007 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 115.
81. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
82. Id. at 414-15. In particular, Ceballos claimed to have been reassigned to a different position,
transferred to a different location, and denied a promotion.
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action asserting that his employer violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments by retaliating against him for performing his job duties.83
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with the
defendant's claim that Ceballos' speech was not entitled to First
Amendment protection since it was written pursuant to his employment
duties. 8 4 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that under the existing case law - Pickering and Connick
the initial question was whether the expressions in question were made by
the speaker "as a citizen upon matters of public concern." 85 If the answer to
that inquiry is yes, the court then will balance the interests of the employee
in free speech against the interest of the employer in responding to it.8 6
Finding that issues of governmental misconduct are inherently matters of
public concern, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the speech was protected
even though it also related to his employment responsibilities.8 7 The Court
of Appeals proceeded then to balance Ceballos' interests in his speech
against his employer's interests in responding to it, finding that there was
no evidence in the record suggesting that Ceballos' speech has resulted in
"disruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney's

Office." 88
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision. The Supreme Court first acknowledged that the Pickering test
provided a useful starting point and that "public employees do not
surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their
employment." 89 The Court went even further by acknowledging that "a
citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen" and that as
long as public employees speak as citizens, "they must face only those
speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate
efficiently and effectively." 90 The Supreme Court also noted that the
interests it sought to protect went beyond the interests of individual
employees. In particular, pointed the Court, the public has an interest "in

83. Id. at 415.
84. Id. In the alternative, the district court held that even if Ceballos' speech was constitutionally
protected, the defendant enjoyed qualified immunity. Id.
85. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F. 3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004). The Court of Appeals had applied
the analysis set forth in Pickeringv. Board of Education of Township High School District, 391 U.S.
563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
86. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173.
87. Id. at 1178.
88. Id. at 1180.
89. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.

90. Id. at 419.
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receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in
civic discussion." 91
Yet, the Court found Ceballos' speech unprotected because his
statements were made pursuant to his official duties. 9 2 "We hold,"
concluded the Court, "that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline." 93 The Court noted that
restricting speech that derives from the employee's official duties "does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen." 9 4 Critical to the Court was the fact that Ceballos' statements were
the result of performing his job, and as such demanded the attention of his
supervisors.9' In such a situation, noted the Court, the employer has
"heightened interests" in controlling the employee's speech, and these
heightened interests require that employers be given sufficient discretion to
manage their operations. 9 6
In response to the concern raised by the Ninth Circuit that it would be
inconsistent to compel public employers to tolerate employees' speech that
was made publicly but not pursuant to their assigned duties, the Supreme
Court drew a particularly strong line between the roles of individuals as
public employees and as citizens. The Court noted that "[e]mployees who
make public statements outside the course of performing their official
duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that
is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the
government." 97 On the other hand, "[w]hen a public employee speaks
pursuant to employment responsibilities . . . there is no relevant analogue to
speech by citizens who are not government employees."98 As to the
concern that the Court's decision might provide an incentive to public
employees to voice their concerns publicly "as citizens" instead of
privately as employees, the Court noted that a public employer could avoid
such incentives by instituting internal policies and procedures to channel
employee criticism. 99 "Giving employees an internal forum for their
91.
92.
93.
94.
(1995)).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 421-22 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
Id. at 423.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
Id.
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speech," noted the Court, "will discourage them from concluding that the
safest avenue of expression is to state their views in public."' 0 0
B. Davenport v. Washington Education Ass'n
Davenport involved consolidated lawsuits by the State of Washington
and a group of non-union public school employees, challenging the
Washington Education Association (WEA) use of agency shop fees. 10 At
issue was Washington State's "opt-in" provision for agency-shop
arrangements. Agency-shop arrangements have been critical to the
financial vitality of unions by requiring nonmember unit employees to pay,
as a condition of their employment, a fee for the role the union plays as
their agent in collective bargaining representation, thus prohibiting
nonmembers from "free riding" on the union's efforts.1 02
The State of Washington allows public sector unions to charge
nonmembers an agency fee and to have the employer collect that fee
through payroll deductions. 0 3 The state law, however, restricts unions
from using these fees in certain kind of activities "unless affirmatively
authorized by the individual" - the so-called "opt-in" requirement. 104
Twice a year and consistent with its obligations under existing law, the
WEA sent all nonmembers information notifying them of their right to
object to paying fees for non-chargeable expenditures. 105 Nonmembers
were given three options regarding these fees: "(1) pay full agency fees by
not objecting within 30 days; (2) object to paying non-chargeable expenses
and receive a rebate as calculated by respondent; or (3) object to paying for
non-chargeable expenses and receive a rebate as determined by an
arbitrator."10'
The approach taken by the WEA was challenged on the grounds that
the union had failed to obtain affirmative authorization from nonmembers
before using their agency fees for election-related purposes.1 07 The

100. Id.
101. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 177 (2007).
102. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
51, 99 (1990).
103. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 177.
104. Section 760 of the Fair Campaign Practices Act provided that "[a] labor organization may not
use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the organization to make
contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a political committee, unless
affirmatively authorized by the individual." WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760 (2009).
105. This information package was referred to as the "Hudson" packet. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 182.
106. Id. at 182-83.
107. Id. at 183.
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Supreme Court of Washington held that the state's imposition of the
affirmative authorization requirement violated the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, reasoning that it was contrary to the balance that the U.S.
Supreme Court had established with regard to agency fee use. According to
the state's Supreme Court, requiring unions to establish that nonmembers
do not object to the expenditure of their agency fees for electoral purposes
violated the union's First Amendment rights. 0 8
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding instead that the
Washington statute was constitutional. The Court noted that Washington
could have eliminated agency-shop arrangements altogether or restricted
the level of fees that public unions could collect from nonmembers.1 09
Further, the court did not see the Washington statute as an impermissible
content-based regulation of speech that would distort the marketplace of
ideas, even though it required affirmative consent only for election-related
expenditures and not other aspects of a union's speech. 110 Describing the
statute as imposing a "viewpoint-neutral limitation," the Court thus
permitted state voters to place the burden on public unions to obtain assent
from nonmembers for all expenditures related to elections, making it harder
for unions to influence the political process."'
The decision, we argue, reflects an interesting, and somewhat
conflicting theme. In the part of the decision in which the Court was
unanimous, the Court appears to recognize the uniqueness of public sector
employment. For example, the Washington State Supreme Court had held
that the state's agency-fee statute was unconstitutional because it upset the
balance that the U.S. Supreme Court agency-fee cases have established. In
particular, the state court noted that the existing case law mandated that a
dissenting nonmember must shoulder the burden of objecting to the manner
in which the union spent agency fees.11 2 In rejecting this argument, the
Court in Davenport acknowledged the unique treatment that public sector
unions are afforded under the Court's agency-fee jurisprudence. The Court
referred to the authority given to public sector unions to levy fees on
government employees, even those who do not wish to join the union, as

108. State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d 352, 35665 (Wash. 2006).
109. Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184.
110. Id.at187-88.
111. Id. at 189.
112. State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 130 P.3d at 357-61. The Washington
Supreme Court relied on the proposition commonly invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court that "dissent is
not to be presumed - it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee."
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977).
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"undeniably unusual."" 3 The Court noted that states clearly have the
authority, if they desire, to deny unions the authority to collect agency fees.
Thus, concluded the Court, the lesser type of restriction imposed under
Washington law, i.e., requiring unions to obtain affirmative permission to
spend the fees in electoral type activities, does not raise any constitutional
concerns. 1 4 The Court's analysis reflects the understanding that public
employment is somewhat unique. That is, the rules that govern the public
employment relationship need to be properly calibrated to meet the needs
of the process they seek to regulate.
The rest of the opinion, in which six Justices joined, reflects a
different approach, however. The WEA had argued that the statute
unconstitutionally drew distinctions based on the content of the union's
speech." 5 In particular, noted the WEA, the statute did not prohibit the use
of agency fees in all traditionally non-chargeable activities, but only in
election activities.11 6 In responding to this argument, the Court initially
acknowledged that the state's statute was in fact drawing a content-based
distinction. The Court also noted that content discrimination is generally
viewed with suspicion since it raises the risk of the government driving
"certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."ll 7 However, the Court
concluded that those concerns were unfounded in this context,
characterizing the potential risk with the state's statute as
"inconsequential.""' 8 The Court compared the prohibition made under the
Washington's statute to prohibitions against obscenity and defamation,
noting that such speech is unprotected and of negligible value to the
marketplace of ideas.11 9 The Court also compared the situation at hand with
cases in which government seeks to regulate speech that it has itself
subsidized. The Court noted that in those cases, the government is allowed
to make content-based distinctions. 120 Similarly here, concluded the Court,
where the state could totally prohibit unions from spending money
collected from nonmember agency fees on any kind of activity, the state
could also choose only to limit expenditures in more specific areas. "The
voters," noted the Court, "did not have to enact an across-the-board
limitation on the use of nonmembers' agency fees by public-sector unions

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
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in order to vindicate their more narrow concern with the integrity of the
election process."1 2 1
Unlike the unanimous part of the opinion, what is missing from this
portion of the opinion is any discussion of context. While the types of
speech to which the Court seeks to analogize union election-related speech
might be appropriate as a matter of constitutional law, they are nonetheless
an odd pair to which one would compare public sector union's electionrelated speech. The comparison, we suggest, illustrates the Court's failure
to recognize the type of dynamics that Professor Summers notes as key to
understanding the public sector employment relationship.
IV. BACK TO SUMMERS' SCHOOL: LESSONS ON THE SPECIAL CHARACTER
OF PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW

While dealing with two seemingly unrelated issues, the Supreme
Court decisions in Garcetti and Davenport represent, we posit, a troubling
trend. Both decisions appear to be grounded in a basic misunderstanding of
the differences that exist between public and private employment. In
particular, both decisions represent a wholesale adoption of the principles
that courts have used in deciding employment and labor cases in the private
sector without much thought being given to whether those principles
should apply to the public sector employment context. In that sense, we
argue, the Court needs to heed Professor Summers' lessons.
A. The Public Employee and Free Speech
One of the key lessons embedded in Professor Summers' scholarship
is the importance of recognizing the "dual" roles employers and employees
play in the public sector. The "duality" lived by public employees both
results in and stems from a complex tension between public employers,
public employees, and the citizenry at large. Public employers (e.g., public
officials) have an obligation to manage their governmental units in ways
that protect the public welfare, allocate resources appropriately, and avoid
abuses of power. In other words, they have obligations and duties to the
general public. At the same time, they view their units as workplaces in
which they must exercise business judgment in oversight of public
employees and maintenance of workplace efficiency. These goals are not
antithetical to each other; in fact, both serve the public interest. 12 2
121. Id. at 189.
122. As previously indicated, workplace efficiency serves the public good because voters want to
obtain services at minimal cost. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Arguably, however, the former obligation is the primary goal; day-to-day
management of the workplace can be viewed as facilitating that goal, as a
means to a public service end.
When viewed this way, the critical role that public employees play in
accomplishing the goals of the public employer becomes apparent. Not
only do these employees directly help to deliver the requisite public
services, but they serve as a critical link between elected officials and the
electorate via a watchdog function. Public officials, whose jobs depend on
the constituency of state and local governments, may tend to manage their
employees in ways that are self-serving in order to preserve their jobs.
They may seek to hide important but unflattering information from the
public; they may become overzealous in behavioral control of the
workplace. In other words, public officials are highly motivated to maintain
discipline by controlling public employee speech, a key part of the political
process that allows public employees to participate in civic discourse.
Although public employees may serve as "bosses" who participate in the
political process to help elect their supervisors, individual employees who
speak out on workplace issues do not have sufficient political power to
provide a meaningful threat to their employers and thus could
opportunistically be subject to discipline or dismissal for voicing their
concerns.1 2 3
Until 2006, public employee speech had long been governed by the
Connick/Pickeringl24 balancing test, which attempted to ensure the free
speech rights of public employees who spoke as citizens on matters of
public concern.1 2 5 Only speech that fit within this framework received First
Amendment protection; concerns about the efficiency of the public
workplace generated a second prong of the test to determine whether the
governmental interest in limiting the speech outweighed the employee's
interest in speaking on the matter of public concern. 1 2 6 In Garcetti, the
Supreme Court shifted the focus even more to the workplace aspect when it
decided that public employee speech made "pursuant to" official job duties

123. The lack of political power versus the general electorate was discussed earlier as being central
to Professor Summers' views. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
124. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74
(1968).
125. Connick, 461 U.S. at 157; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573-74.
126. At least one commentator has argued that because the Connick/Pickeringtest does not sweep
in all public employee speech as protected under the First Amendment, even it is arguably too
deferential to the public managerial prerogative. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in
the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1109, 1119
(1988).
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was not deserving of First Amendment protection. 127 This primary,
magnified focus on the efficient workplace aspect of the governmental unit
reflects a view of the public employer through the lens of the private
employer, without adequate consideration of the functioning of the unit in
providing public services. Garcetti therefore represents a step toward
"privatization" of the public workplace.
Although the majority opinion in Garcetti recognized that public
employees can make significant contributions to civic discourse, it
effectively determined that any speech within a public employee's official
job duties was made outside of the role of citizen. According to the Court
in Garcetti, while speech by a public employee who speaks as a citizen
addressing a matter of public concern requires First Amendment scrutiny,
speech that occurs while "the employee is simply performing his or her job
duties" warrants no similar degree of scrutiny.1 28 "To hold otherwise,"
noted the Court "would be to demand permanent judicial intervention in the
conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and the separation of powers." 1 29 The dual nature
of the public employee was minimized in the interest of providing less
government intrusion into the inner workings of the public workplace and
more deference to the public official as employer. The chilling effect on
public employees' providing of their watchdog function was not adequately
addressed. The question of whether speech made pursuant to official job
duties disrupted the workplace - even potentially - is no longer reached.1 30
The public employer now enjoys free rein in limiting this form of speech,
which, according to the majority in Garcetti, is akin to any supervisor
conducting a performance appraisal of a subordinate. 131 The public
employer now enjoys private "ownership" of public employee speech
articulated as part of official job duties. This displacement of managerial
discretion by judicial supervision finds no support in existing case law. As
a result of the per se holding in Garcetti, whether speech made in
accordance with a public employee's official job duties may also be a
matter of public concern is irrelevant. Thus, from a privatization
perspective, the Court has elevated the role of governmental employee as
mere worker and downplayed the employee's role as serving the public
127. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
128. Id. at 423.
129. Id.
130. In Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit, applying the Connick/Pickering balancing, had held that
Ceballos' speech was on a matter of public concern and that the potential for workplace disruption was
insufficient to rule for the government. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
131. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
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interest.
The privatization tendency is also reflected in another interesting
aspect of the majority opinion. Towards the end of his opinion and in
response to concerns raised by the lower court that granting First
Amendment protection only to employees speaking as citizens will perhaps
create incentives for public employees to voice their complaints publicly
instead of internally to their employers, Justice Kennedy encouraged public
employers to institute "internal policies and procedures" for dealing with
employee work-related criticism and complaints. He offered that giving
public employees an "internal forum for their speech" would perhaps
"discourage them" from stating their "views in public." 1 32
Although in no way acknowledging this in his opinion, Justice
Kennedy in many respects is applying to public employees in Garcettithe
Supreme Court's classic 1960's Steelworkers Trilogy model of private
sector employee/industrial relations.1 33 The Steelworkers Trilogy
emphasized the development of employer/union internal grievance
procedures culminating ultimately in outside labor arbitration.1 34 The
explicit "quid pro quo" of these internal fora for employee grievances was
that employees would not take their grievances public, i.e., go on strike,
during the term of a given labor contract.' 35 Instead of making a "federal
case" of an employee grievance or complaint, "dirty laundry" regarding
workplace issues would instead be resolved internally. 136 Indeed, in a series
of important cases the Supreme Court even allowed employers to obtain
federal court injunctions enforcing labor contract grievance procedure "no
strike clauses," even through Congress seemingly explicitly prohibited
federal courts from issuing injunctions against "labor disputes" in the 1932
Norris-LaGuardia Act.1 37

&

132. Id. at 424 (noting that a public employer could encourage its employees to voice concerns
privately by "instituting internal policies and procedures that are receptive to employee criticism.
Giving employees an internal forum for their speech will discourage them from concluding that the
safest avenue of expression is to state their views in public").
133. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
134. The presumption of arbitrability is a strong one. As stated by the Supreme Court in Warrior
Gulf Navigation Co., "[d]oubts [regarding the applicability of arbitration] should be resolved in favor of
coverage." Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582, 583.
135. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (Douglas, J.).
136. Id.
137. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act has contained this prohibition since its inception. 47
Stat. 70 (1932). However, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 778, 398 U.S. 235, 25455 (1970), the Supreme Court permitted a federal injunction against a strike that violated a no-strike
clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Boys Markets represents the Supreme Court's
reconciliation of the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition on injunctions of labor disputes with Section 301 of
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The use of the grievance procedure and arbitration as a means of
resolving disputes over the terms of collective bargaining agreements and
as a means for administering the labor contract is likely a normatively
sound policy (and a policy that enjoys many supporters). Our argument is
not that encouraging grievance arbitration is a misguided policy, but
instead that the Court's approach in Garcetti reflects the transplanting of a
private sector employment framework into public employment without the
type of careful analysis that Professor Summers suggests is warranted.
B. Public Employees, Collective Bargaining, and Agency Shops
Professor Summers' scholarship is relevant not only with regard to the
issue of employee speech, but also with regard to our understanding of the
political process through which decisions that affect public employees are
made. As discussed above, Professor Summers aptly observes that public
employees have a number of mechanisms to try to influence the terms and
conditions of employment. Unlike private employees, as voters, public
employees have the ability to influence who sits across the bargaining
table. As citizens they also have the ability to participate in the public
discourse through the normal political process. Where available, collective
bargaining represents one more avenue, and to some extent an
extraordinary one, for public employees to present their preferences to the
employer and to have those preferences heard in a meaningful way.
Professor Summers convincingly argues that the extraordinary step of
providing public employees with another mechanism to influence their
terms of employment is entirely justified once we take into account the
political nature of public employment. Collective bargaining on conditions
of employment serves the important purpose of maintaining the workplace
function of the government, as it does with private employees, but in the
governmental context, that workplace function must be viewed in its
critical role of providing services to the public. Unions therefore serve a
particularly important function in the public sector: They protect the public
employee, who would be powerless as an individual to offset the
citizenry's interest in having a low-cost government.13 8 Thus, unions
engage in the political process, helping to balance the power between
public employees and the electorate.
The fact that public employees are granted the ability to influence

the Labor Management Relations Act's provision for lawsuits to settle breaches of collective bargaining
agreements.
138. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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employment decisions via collective bargaining, however, does not imply
that the avenues otherwise available to public employees must, or should
be, closed. In fact, Professor Summers is very careful in making it clear
that public sector collective bargaining, while extraordinary in nature,
should not and cannot be the only method for influencing governmental
decisionmaking regarding terms and conditions of employment. He
emphasizes, for example, that the type of issues that should be channeled
through the collective bargaining process (i.e., mandatory subjects) ought
to be limited to those where the there is a need to balance the inherent
disadvantage faced by public employees in the political process. Professor
Summers also recognizes that in the public sector collective bargaining is
an inadequate mechanism to make decisions with regard to bargainable
issues. Problems such as end-run bargaining and the separation of
bargaining responsibilities from the budgeting process limit the ability of
public employees to safeguard some of the gains they believe they have
made at the bargaining table. 13 9
Thus, union representation in the public sector is based on the
understanding that the collective bargaining process represents only one
component of the relationship between the public employee and the public
employer. To be effective, public sector unions must have the ability to
access the political process through other means, since both parties
understand that collective bargaining is part of a broader political process.
In the public sector, just as workplace-related speech cannot readily be
separated from speech that is germane to the political process, collective
bargaining duties related to conditions of employment cannot readily be
seen as distinct from a union's political activities. Whether normatively
appropriate or not, public policies that make it harder for public sector
unions to engage in political activities also, in turn, make it harder for them
to fulfill the full panoply of their bargaining responsibilities. By allowing
the imposition under state law of the opt-in requirement, we argue, the U.S.
Supreme Court did exactly that in Davenport.
Courts and various administrative agencies have struggled with the
issue of the appropriateness of allowing unions in both the private and
public sectors to collect fees from nonmember employees. In the private
sector, although agency shops are permissible, restrictions have been
imposed on the ability of a union to spend funds on activities that are not
related to collective bargaining when non-union members object. 14 0 In

139. See supra Part II.A.
140. This also applies to administration of the collective bargaining agreement. Commc'n Workers
of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 758 (1988).
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cases involving private sector employees, the manner in which union fees
are used has been tightly constrained. For example, the Court has adopted
language limiting the types of uses to which dues collected from
nonmember employees are appropriate to those related to the "negotiation
and administration of collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the
adjustment of grievances and disputes"1 4 1 and those "necessary or
reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on
labor-management issues."1 42 Using this standard, the Supreme Court has
found the expenditures of nonmembers' fees on political activities, 143
organizing employees outside the bargaining unit, and litigation not
involving the bargaining unit1 44 to be impermissible.
The Court also has found that similar limitations apply in the public
sector. In cases involving the use of nonmembers' dues by public sector
unions, the Court has made clear that only "expenses that are relevant or
'germane' to the collective-bargaining functions of the union" are
permissible. 14 Agency shops are also permissible as long as unions
provide a mechanism by which those opposed to non-collective bargaining
activities can be reimbursed for the percentage of the agency fee that goes
to such activities - so-called "ideological" expenditures. 146 However, the
Court has also recognized that because of the political nature of the
governmental decisionmaking process, drawing the line between
permissible and impermissible fee assessments in the public sector context
is likely to be "somewhat hazier." 1 47 As the Court has noted, "[t]he process
of establishing a written collective-bargaining agreement prescribing the
terms and conditions of employment may require not merely concord at the
bargaining table, but subsequent approval by other public authorities." 48
Recognizing this reality, the Court has allowed for the collection of
full agency-shop fees from nonmembers, with adequate provision for them
to "opt out" and receive a rebate of that portion of the fees that cannot be

141. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 769 (1961) (interpreting the Railway Labor
Act).
142. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984) (interpreting the Railway Labor Act);
see also Beck, 487 U.S. at 760.
143. Street, 367 U.S. at 769-70.
144. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 451-53.
145. Lenhert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 516 (1991).
146. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977). The issue for public sector unions
involves the constitutionality of allowing the government, as party to the collective bargaining
agreement, to restrict the freedom of association of employees who are not members of the union.
147. Id. at 236.
148. Id.
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charged to them upon their objection.1 49 Prior to Davenport, the Supreme
Court had never decided whether affirmative consent - i.e., an "opt-in"
was permissible under the First Amendment before a union could spend a
nonmember's agency fee for "ideological purposes that are not germane to
the union's collective bargaining duties."150
The Court's decision in Davenport represents a departure from the
understanding reflected in earlier Supreme Court cases regarding the
differences in the roles that unions play in the private and public
employment sectors. In the public sector, negotiating a collective
bargaining agreement is but a part of the representation process. Due to the
political nature of the governmental decisionmaking process, full
implementation and protection of the gains made at the bargaining table
will likely require the union to pressure the public employer in a variety of
other ways. Policies that make it harder for public sector unions to engage
in that kind of multi-level representation undoubtedly influence the ability
of public employees to affect their working conditions. Earlier Supreme
Court decisions recognized such complexity and just as Professor Summers
has warned, avoided imposing considerations well-suited in the private
sector to the "somewhat hazier" public sector context. The Court's decision
in Davenport appears to ignore that warning, thereby furthering the
privatization of public sector employment and labor law.
V. CONCLUSION

Attending Summers' School means learning the lessons that
accompany distinctions between public and private employment and
becoming an expert on the special character of the public employment
animal. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court appears to have "played truant"
in its holdings in Garcetti and Davenport. Although these decisions address
different legal issues and touch on somewhat different aspects of public
employment, they nonetheless fail in similar ways to incorporate the
critical link between terms and conditions of public employment and public
employees' participation in the political process. In Garcetti, the Court held
that public employee speech made pursuant to official job duties is per se
outside of First Amendment protection, thus failing to understand how
speech offered as a part of job performance simultaneously might
contribute to the very public discourse that helps to determine the
149. Additionally, there are certain requirements that must be met for the union to collect agency-

shop fees, one of which is that the fees reasonably in dispute must be held in escrow. Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
150. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
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requirements of that performance. Similarly, in Davenport the Court failed
to demonstrate a deeper understanding of the interweaving of a union's
political activities and its collective bargaining duties related to
employment.
Professor Summers has provided an elegant and detailed framework
for understanding public employment, insightfilly highlighting that its
special character is due to the nature of the public employer. It is this
insight that provides the most fundamental lesson of Summers' School:
Limiting the ability of public sector employees to be viewed as public
citizens also limits their abilities to protect their employment rights. We
admonish the Supreme Court to take this lesson to heart and to adopt a
jurisprudence that focuses on, in the words of Professor Summers, "what
practices in the public sector will improve the political process." 15 1

151. A PoliticalPerspective, supra note 8, at 1161.

